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The Aesthetics of Conversation: Dewey and Davidson
  Kalle Puolakka 
Abstract
Conversation is one of the most mundane events of human life, yet the
conversations we have can vary a lot. Some proceed only with great
effort, while others engage us thoroughly. Drawing on Dewey’s
aesthetics, this paper argues that the movement and rhythm of
conversations can make them into genuine candidates for an aesthetic
status. The key term of the paper is interaction. For Dewey, all
experience, aesthetic experience included, is constituted by an
interaction between humans and their environment. In his later
philosophy of language, which is critical of conventionalist explanations
of language, Davidson, in turn, offers a very rich account of the
interactions conversations can involve. He cites the novels of James
Joyce as an extreme example of just how intricate the forms of linguistic
interaction can become. Though the notion of aesthetic experience does
not figure in Davidson’s account, his analysis of the conditions for
successful communication can nevertheless be seen to shed light on
those features of conversations that explain Dewey’s interest in their
aesthetic dimension.
Key Words 
aesthetic experience, communication, conversation, Davidson, Dewey,
everyday aesthetics, interaction
1. Introduction
Despite the recent upsurge of interest in the aesthetic aspects of
everyday phenomena, such as food, clothing, design, people’s homes,
and the environments in which those homes are situated, there has
been no extensive aesthetic analysis of one of life’s most common
occurrences: conversations. This paper develops an aesthetic account
of conversation on the basis of the views of two important figures of
American philosophy, John Dewey and Donald Davidson. Dewey
occasionally uses actual conversations to illuminate some of the key
elements of his aesthetic theory.[1] This is no surprise, given that he
sees interaction between humans and their environment as the source of
all experience and the basis of aesthetic experience, the key notion of
his aesthetics. Conversation is arguably among the most fundamental
forms of human interaction and, for Dewey, it is a good example of an
experiential situation that can form an integral whole with a clearly
distinguishable beginning and end. Such qualities, he argues, are
essential preconditions of aesthetic experience.
However, Dewey does not fully explicate the structure of a conversation
that he finds worthy to be called aesthetic. Davidson’s later philosophy
of language proves helpful here because the emphasis it places on the
unexpected, passing, and creative elements of language use points to
ways in which conversation can be understood in aesthetic terms.
Aesthetic-related considerations already have a role in Davidson’s much
discussed view. In a few articles he extends the key ideas of his later
philosophy of language to an analysis of literary language and
interpretation, formulating a view that comes very close to the position
currently known as moderate or modest actual intentionalism in the
analytic philosophy of art , and considers the work of James Joyce as
epitomizing the kind of creative language use he wants philosophy of
language to take more seriously. It is also noteworthy that in the
beginning of one his most well-known articles, “A Nice Derangement of
Epitaphs,” Davidson cites the language use of the comedian and radio
sitcom writer Goodman Ace to support his anti-conventionalist view of
language. The notion of the aesthetic, as such, does not appear in
Davidson’s account but I believe the detailed analysis of the conditions
for successful communication that he formulates, centering on what he
calls a prior and a passing theory of language, supplements Dewey’s
reflections on the aesthetic potentiality of conversations. Together they
show that conversation is an everyday phenomenon that can be
meaningfully included among the topics of philosophical aesthetics.
The perspective on conversations that I offer in this paper is not wholly
novel because Scott Stroud, inspired by Dewey, has also provided an
analysis of the aesthetic sides of communication. However, while Stroud
finds a distinctive kind of attitudinal orientation toward the situation by the
interlocutors fundamental to making conversation aesthetic, I think this is
just half of the story. My perspective on Dewey and Davidson’s views
shows that what makes conversation aesthetic has to do with the
character of the interaction that emerges between the conversationalists.
A proper orientation from the conversationalists can help but that cannot
alone guarantee that the interaction will give rise to an experience
Dewey would call aesthetic.
An aesthetic conversation has to possess a particular kind of structure.
My account can be seen as continuing the many lines of theorizing in
which interaction is situated at the very heart of aesthetics. This idea not
only figures prominently in Arnold Berleant’s aesthetics of engagement,
which has been strongly influenced by Dewey’s aesthetics, but it
frequently appears in theories of the aesthetics of the performance arts,
photography, computer art, as well as interpretation in general, which
has been likened to a conversation with the author.[2],[3],[4],[5],[6] Music
is also frequently analyzed in conversationalist terms. Not only are
musical phrases analyzed as being responses to one another but also
the relationship between conductor and soloist is sometimes likened to a
conversation in that they respond to each other’s actions in very much
the same sense as conversationalists do. These considerations give
initial support for the idea that conversations can be examined from an
aesthetic perspective.
The account I develop below also lays a stress on the social aspects of
language use. There is nothing new in saying that language is a social
art; it’s the first sentence of Quine’s seminal book Word and Object
(1960). But many have stressed that aesthetic experience is an
important element of various social phenomena. Public art is one
powerful example of how the social and the aesthetic can come
together. Dewey also stresses their connection, for he attributes an
important aesthetic dimension to the different rituals that bring people
together, and also to the communal experiences they create. Dewey also
hints at the possibility that conversations, too, could be the source of
these kinds of communal experiences in his often-cited example of “that
meal in a Paris restaurant” by which he illuminates his notion of “an
experience,” a kind of elementary phase of aesthetic experience. It is
very unlikely that Dewey was thinking of a meal eaten alone and in
silence.[7] This paper takes a more thorough look at the social character
of aesthetic conversations. This aesthetic and communal level also has
important social ramifications that I will briefly touch on in the final part of
the paper, following on from my defense of the aesthetic status of
conversations.
2. Dewey on aesthetic experience and conversations
Given the slightly rambling way in which Dewey develops his
understanding of aesthetic experience, in addition to the dense prose he
uses to describe this form of experience, it is good for any aesthetic
theorizing that relies more substantially on his account to explain on
what sort of interpretation of that notion it is based. Also, different
aspects of Dewey’s analysis are relevant in different contexts. In the
context of conversations, the emphasis Dewey places on the process-
like and temporal character of aesthetic experience proves fruitful. For
Dewey, “an instantaneous experience is impossible,” for experience is
“the product… of continuous and cumulative interaction of an organic
self with the world.”[8] This shows the evolutionary background of
Dewey’s philosophy of experience; experience is a matter of how an
organism adapts to and copes with the environment. Aesthetic
experience has a timely dimension because it has to undergo a
distinctive kind of development for it to count as an aesthetic experience.
The qualities it has to exhibit include accumulation, rhythm, intensity,
resistance building tension, and consummation, and all these qualities
are, moreover, gathered together in a sense of wholeness. “Instead of
signifying a surrender to caprice and disorder,” Dewey writes, aesthetic
experience “affords our sole demonstration of a stability that is not
stagnation but is rhythmic and developing. Because experience is
fulfillment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a world of
things, it contains the promise of that delightful perception which is
esthetic experience.”[9] I believe that conversations too can be marked
by the type of organizational structure Dewey places at the center of
aesthetic experience.
Dewey’s own references to communication and conversation, in
particular, are meant to draw attention to how the beginning and end of
aesthetic experience are intimately tied to one another and how
aesthetic experience, thus, constitutes an integral whole, that the
beginning of the experience, in a way, contains the seeds of its
ending.[10] In other words, the beginning underdetermines how the
experience has to proceed for it to become infused by aesthetic qualities
and what counts as a closure of the experience. As with many other
situations, it is possible for a conversation to have an internal momentum
that can run its course to “fulfillment.”[11] For Dewey, that sort of ending
constitutes an aesthetic moment.
Language use, of course, can be rendered aesthetic, for example,
through beautiful wording, catchy imagery, witticism, metaphor, and
imaginative wordplay. Even such things as tone of voice, facial
expressions, and gestures can contribute to the aesthetic character of a
conversation. Dewey, however, is interested in conversation as an
aesthetic phenomenon in a more wide-ranging sense. It has to do
precisely with how the conversation unfolds, that is, its structure and
form. Conversation can be aesthetic even if its material, that is, “signs
and symbols,” does not, in most cases, have intrinsically aesthetic
quality. In Dewey’s view, conversations, like many other intellectual
endeavors, can have “an artistic structure,” in which case “the
experience itself has a satisfying emotional quality because it possesses
internal integration and fulfillment reached through ordered and
organized movement.”[12] Not all conversations exhibit this type of
developmental structure but have qualities that Dewey associates with
what he calls “non-esthetic experience.” In contrast to conversations that
achieve fulfillment through a process of accumulation, such
conversations have “beginnings and cessations, but no genuine
initiations and concludings.”[13] There is only a “loose succession” of
different parts of the conversation, and the conversationalists’
relationship to the communication situation is “external and partial.”[14]
In a way, the conversation just drifts and ends at a random point. Such
conversations terminate without the sense of closure that Dewey insists
is essential to aesthetic experience. In the worst case, the
conversationalists just part ways feeling empty.
A scene from the TV-show Frasier serves to illuminate conversations
having a non-aesthetic quality. Depressed by his poor love life, in one
episode Frasier, urged by his friend Roz, goes to a singles bar to meet
some women. As an elitist who is more accustomed to dinner parties,
private clubs, and opera banquets, Frasier finds the situation highly
awkward and has to ask Roz for help in getting started in the mating
game. At the bar, Frasier meets Kim and though communication
between them does not proceed smoothly, with Frasier, for example,
continuously failing to perceive her subtle hints about how the evening
might continue, they eventually leave together for Frasier’s place. Upon
arrival Kim gasps at Frasier’s stunning apartment and, in response, he
asks whether she would like a tour. The following conversation ensues:
“Kim: I don't know. What do you want to show me? Frasier: I don't know.
Uh, what do you want to see? Kim: What would you like me to see?
Frasier: Whatever you came here to see. Kim: And what did I come here
to see? Frasier: Is there an end to this? Because I'm starting to feel
redundant on my part.”[15] Such feelings of redundancy are among the
factors that reduce the aesthetic feel of conversations.
This example shows that, on the Deweyan account, the aesthetics of
conversations primarily depends on the form of the conversation, not on
its content. The problem with the conversation between Frasier and Kim,
from an aesthetic point of view, is its excessive repetitiveness that
makes its accumulation impossible. The topic of the conversation does
not reduce its potentiality to have an aesthetic character as such. Were
Kim to be as linguistically clever and witty as Frasier, their mating game
could possess the aesthetic characteristics specified above. In fact,
imaginative erotic exchanges have been thought to involve precisely
such qualities.[16] The conversation between Frasier and Kim also
serves to show that an outsider’s perspective on a conversation can be
very different from the conversationalists’. An onlooker, for example,
might find the situation in Frasier’s apartment extremely funny, perhaps
taking it as a kind of satire played out of how awkward romantic
situations can be. But for the conversationalists themselves it offers very
little aesthetic gratification.
The way in which aesthetic conversations differ from those that fail to
achieve an aesthetic level is also captured well by the common
distinction between making and having a conversation. In making a
conversation, we are not fully engaged in the situation and the
conversation lacks a sense of direction, sometimes proceeding only with
great effort, as in Frasier’s case. In contrast, having a conversation
involves an inner movement and accumulation of the conversation that
Dewey finds typical in aesthetic experience. The interaction suggests a
genuine participation by the interlocutors, giving the conversation a life
of its own that drives the participants forward. There is accumulation,
and the different phases of the conversation build on one another. In all
intellectual endeavors that deserve to be called aesthetic, Dewey claims
“there runs a sense of growing meaning conserved and accumulating
toward an end that is felt as accomplishment of a process.”[17] From
Dewey’s viewpoint, a conversation, too, can demonstrate this type of
process. It does not simply end at a random point but is “so rounded out
that its close is a consummation not a cessation.”[18] The ending of the
conversation is felt as “a consummation of a movement.”[19] Unlike
making conversation, in this case, the conversationalists part ways with
a sense of fulfillment or even with a sense of being one experience
richer. Alas, it’s not a conversation that poor Frasier gets to have in the
above excerpt.
3. Davidson on the complexities of communication
As surprising as it may sound, the key ideas in Davidson’s later
philosophy of language provide deeper insight into the constituents of a
Deweyan aesthetic conversation. Davidson takes a more ground-level
look at how interaction between conversationalists has to proceed for it
to reach an aesthetic level. Davidson argues that views that emphasize
the indispensable role of conventions and rule-governed practices in
linguistic meaning cannot provide a complete picture of how successful
communication is possible. Such views, he says, do not take into
account linguistic phenomena, such as malapropisms and novel sayings,
in which understanding takes place even though linguistic conventions
are broken, either deliberately or unintentionally.[20] Following Grice,
Davidson puts forward a view that connects the meaning of what is said
with the speaker’s intentions. The speaker has to take into account the
interlocutors’ readiness to interpret him correctly, what Davidson calls
“the requirement of interpretability,” by providing sufficient clues or
leading the conversation in a direction that will allow them to grasp the
intended meanings.[21]  Linguistic conventions, in other words, cannot
impose any determinable limits on what can be meant but they do
underdetermine the ways in which the speaker has to make himself
interpretable. Referring to Joyce’s linguistic experiments in Ulysses and
Finnegan’s Wake, Davidson claims that with enough creativity and
stage-setting there really is no saying how much language usage can
deviate from standard norms and still remain meaningful.[22]
Davidson further illuminates his account of the conditions for
communication with a distinction between a prior and a passing theory of
language. These theories have a different role, depending on whose
perspective we look at the conversation, the speaker’s or the listener’s.
The listener’s “prior theory expresses how he is prepared in advance to
interpret an utterance of the speaker,” while for the speaker, “the prior
theory is what he believes the interpreter’s theory to be.”[23] The
passing theory, in turn, is the true locus of communication, as the
passing theory of the speaker expresses how they intend to be
interpreted and for the listener, in turn, how they actually interpret the
speaker’s words. When the passing theories of the speaker and listener
converge, communication succeeds.
The prior theory, in other words, gives a setting for the communication
situation and is constituted by the assumptions the interlocutors have of
each other’s linguistic habits and capacities, deriving, for example, from
each other’s “character, dress, role, [and] sex,” as well as from their
linguistic and other previous behavior.[24] However, communication can
develop in a direction in which the listener’s prior theory no longer
accounts for the intended meanings of the speaker’s words. A speaker
may provide “information relevant to interpreting an utterance in the
course of making the utterance.”[25] There is no reason why speakers
have to remain within the confines of what they assume the listener’s
prior theory to be but, with sufficient stage-setting and clues, the speaker
can make them “gear” their passing theory “to the occasion,” as
Davidson puts it, so that they will be able to catch the intended
meanings.[26]
This, in a nutshell, is the requirement of interpretability: “you cannot
change what words mean… merely by intending to…, but you can
change the meaning provided you believe (and perhaps are justified in
believing) that the interpreter has adequate clues for the new
interpretation.”[27] This emphasis brings creativity to the very heart of
language use and, for Davidson, Joyce’s writing epitomizes this type of
linguistic usage. He writes: “Joyce draws on every resource his readers
command (or that he hopes they command, or thinks they should
command), every linguistic resource, knowledge of history, geography,
past writers, and styles. He forces us both to look at and listen to his
words to find the puns and fathom the references.”[28] Joyce is
admittedly a rather extreme case but, as Davidson sees no principled
distinction between literary and ordinary language, there is no reason
why similar types of interactions could not take place in non-literary,
everyday contexts too.
Davidson’s argument against overly stressing the conventionalist and
rule-governed character of language is that it is impossible to specify
how far the prior theories of the speaker and listener will suffice in a
given linguistic interaction. It is equally impossible to lay down any
systematic account of how listeners are able to gear their passing theory
to give the correct interpretation of what the speaker has said. This
explains Davidson’s use of his epithet passing. The element that
grounds an understanding in one context may have no role in another;
the success of communication can even involve an entre-nous between
the interlocutors. In other words, there is no “chance of regularizing” how
the speaker’s and the listener’s passing theories coincide; in many
cases it is guaranteed by “wit, luck, and wisdom” but also capacities,
such as “empathy and imagination,” Davidson believes.[29],[30]
Of course, conversation can proceed along familiar paths. But
Davidson’s view shows that it can also include very intricate interplay
between the conversationalists. What Davidson’s analysis also points
out is that conversationalists themselves have an impact on the
structure of the conversation they are taking part in. Some aesthetic
theories describe the experience of art as involving an interaction
between artwork and recipient.[31] In conversation, however, the
interaction is much more concrete, for the interlocutors can literally
respond to each other’s actions and are thus able to directly mold the
conversational situation. Noël Carroll suggests this is one of the key
differences between the interactions that take place within conversations
and those occurring in the interpretation of art.[32] It is only through the
conversationalists’ own efforts that conversation can be made into the
kind of cumulative process that renders it aesthetic. It becomes almost a
joint and collaborative project between the interlocutors, even
resembling some forms of participatory art. Arnold Berleant, in his social
aesthetics, beautifully captures the character of this collaboration. In
such social situations, “creative processes are at work in its participants,
who emphasize and shape the perceptual features, and supply meaning
and interpretation. There is no art object here, of course, but the
situation itself becomes the focus of perceptual attention.” Berleant
continues: “And at the same time as its participants contribute to
creating the aesthetic character of the situation, they may recognize with
appreciative delight its special qualities, and perhaps work, as a
performer would, at increasing and enhancing them.”[33] Though
Berleant does not discuss conversation, it is arguably a very good
example of what he means by aesthetically rewarding social situations.
My investigation of the main points of Davidson’s later philosophy of
language shows that communication can rest on very intricate factors
that are relevant from the perspective of this paper. He portrays
conversation as involving interaction between interlocutors that is similar
to how Dewey views aesthetic experience. Both Dewey and Davidson
emphasize the role of the imagination, not in the sense of building
mental imagery or make-believe that have been dominant in the analytic
philosophy of literature but in the Deweyan sense that likens imagination
to the mental capacity “to see and feel things as they compose an
integral whole.”[34] In conversations, imagination can be seen as the
capacity to build a picture of what will make a good next move in the
conversation, given how it has proceeded, that will either further it or
serve as a meaningful conclusion. For Davidson, expectations and
anticipations are important parts of a conversation. How they are taken
into account by the conversationalists has a great impact on the
movement and rhythm of the conversation. Some utterances might be
unexpected and take the conversation in new directions; some in turn
are foreseeable but are experienced as appropriate, giving a satisfying
feeling of wholeness. It may even be that a conversationalist uses
particular words in the expectation that they will elicit a particular
response. This will give the conversation an air of suspense. Some
moves in the conversation can, in turn, seem banal and inappropriate,
running the risk of reducing the flow of the conversation.
This picture of the interaction involved in conversation resonates well
with the Deweyan aesthetic framework, which views aesthetic
experience as having “the rhythm of expecting and satisfaction to be
internally complete.”[35] Expectations and anticipations serve to create
tension in a conversation, too. Some linguistic moves within the
conversation can, in turn, release the tension that has built up, serving
as a climax to the conversation. Goodman Ace was considered a master
of this type of language use. Describing Ace’s linguistic
accomplishments, Davidson cites his particularly good selection of “the
ideal phrase for the situation,” hitting the nail right on the head.[36] In
Deweyan terminology, Ace had an ability to bring conversations to a
consummation. That, for Dewey, is also an aesthetic moment, and it is
something that sadly is missing from the conversation between Frasier
and Kim.
This type of climax is not often reached in a conversation. We may leave
feeling that much more could have been made of it, that some more
appropriate phrase might have brought the conversation to a meaningful
conclusion. Sometimes we are even convinced that the conversation,
given how it has proceeded, needs a particular kind of next move. We
almost literally feel there is a hole or an empty spot in the conversation
that has to be filled with suitable words. The awkwardness that some
people feel in the face of silence is one example of the force of this pull.
Sometimes the required words can spring to one’s mind only after the
conversation. George Costanza, one of the main characters in the
American TV sitcom Seinfeld, demonstrates an extreme example of this
situation. In one episode, George becomes the butt of a joke in a
conversation and, after the incident, he comes up with a riposte that he
thinks is so good that he goes to great efforts to recreate the situation.
When George gets the opportunity to present his punch line, his
opponent subsequently trumps it with a further riposte, and George
again sinks into a state of emptiness, following his short-lived triumph.
Even the negative experiences we can encounter in conversations show
that conversation can exhibit movement and rhythm that, in the best
instances, make them into genuine aesthetic happenings. Actually, for
George’s linguistic opponent, the situation has a culminating moment.
Also, unlike George, the onlookers of the situation in the episode seem
to appreciate the wittiness of the opponent’s new riposte. This case
again shows that the aesthetic character of conversations can vary,
depending on whether one is part of the conversation or just an
onlooker, which was already touched upon in connection with the case
of Frasier and Kim.
4. Orientation or interaction?
To flesh out the details of the account on the aesthetics of conversation I
shall present an alternative view that equally draws on Dewey, that of
Scott Stroud. In his attempt to outline a basis for an artful life, Stroud
asks, “How can one move everyday communicative activity from the
realm of statements to the realm connected with aesthetic experience or
expression?”[37] His goal is, thus, the same as mine.
For Stroud, an appropriate orientation to the communicative situation is
fundamental to revealing its aesthetic aspects. He notes that
communication has two sides, either as a means or as an end in itself. It
can be used as a means to achieve some ulterior end, such as making
one’s thoughts public, buying a ticket or ordering a meal. Sometimes the
means and ends are completely disconnected. The act of
communication itself can even be experienced as a necessary ordeal to
reach a desired end, when ordering something to eat from an impolite
waiter, for example. Stroud thinks that a very different kind of orientation
towards communication can also be taken; the communicative situation
can be valued for its own sake. It’s not necessary to locate the value of
communication solely to the products of communicative acts; the
process itself can have value. Stroud writes: “Communication is both a
means to future states of affairs and an immediately valuable, felt
instantiation of harmony and coordination with others.”[38] The means
and ends of communication, in other words, need not be as
disconnected as they often seem to be in everyday communication. The
communication situation can also be felt as an integrated whole. It’s just
a matter of orientation: “One’s orientation toward communicative activity
can focus one’s attention in such a way as to foreground its value as a
mere means; it is at this point that communicative interaction loses any
felt, immediate value and instead gains the promised value only of the
end yet to be achieved.”[39]
To make his case that proper orientation is key to making
communication an aesthetic event, Stroud refers to Dewey’s example of
the different attitudes of passengers on a ferryboat crossing New York’s
Hudson River. Some passengers might just see the trip as a necessity
involved in getting to the other side of the river; the process has to be
endured for the sake of the end desire. A person interested in real estate
could, in turn, speculate during the trip about the prices of the
apartments and offices that the ferry passes along the way. But another
type of orientation to the trip is also possible. It could include an
appreciation of the New York skyline, how the colors and shapes of the
different buildings relate to one another and form an integrated unity.
With proper orientation to the situation, the view can begin to have “form
in the artistic sense,” transforming the ferry ride from a mere necessity to
an aesthetic event that is valued for its own sake.[40] From Dewey’s
reflections, Stroud concludes that orientation is fundamental to making
experience aesthetic: “A certain way of experiencing an object with a
certain sort of attention and absorption characterizes what Dewey labels
‘aesthetic experience’.”[41] Stroud even suggests that there is a hint of
mindfulness in Dewey’s account, in that “one ought to focus one’s
attention on the materials of the immediate situation, and not on some
remote goal or outcome that desire inclines one toward.” This sort of
mindful attention makes it possible to see the communication situation
as “a qualitative whole,” like aesthetic experience.[42]
In my view, Stroud’s analysis does not go deep enough, for it does not
pay enough attention to the fundamental pillar of Dewey’s whole
philosophy of experience, the environment, including not only the natural
and urban spaces that humans inhabit and encounter but all “those
conditions that promote or hinder, stimulate or inhibit, the characteristic
activities of a living being.”[43] Aesthetic experience, in other words, has
“objective conditions,” and not all conditions make possible the
“cumulation, conservation, reinforcement, transition” of the experience
“into something more complete.”[44] From this perspective, experience
is a matter of how a situation unfolds and develops. My reading of
Dewey and Davidson provides a picture of how a conversation or some
other type of communication situation has to proceed in order for it to
have an aesthetic character. This account gives insight into the objective
conditions of aesthetic experience in the case of conversations and it
shows that a proper orientation alone does not guarantee that a
conversation attains an aesthetic character. It’s the quality of the
interaction that matters. A change of orientation does not even seem to
be required; one can be pulled into a conversation so fully that no
special effort occurs. Aesthetic experience can be something that, in a
way, just grabs you. Sometimes conversationalists’ incapacity to take on
the kind of orientation central to Stroud’s explanation can surely prohibit
a conversation from reaching an aesthetic level. Yet, the orientation
cannot fully explain how a conversation is transformed into an aesthetic
phenomenon.
An interlocutor’s lack of attention can indeed undermine the aesthetic
aspects of a conversation, as Stroud claims, but in a very specific sense
that he does not discuss. Improper orientation does not weaken the
conversationalist’s own experience, in that they would be unable to
experience the situation as an integrated whole. But by failing to
respond to the others’ communicative moves in the kind of way specified
in the first parts of the paper because of improper orientation, they can
ruin the conversation for all parties, not just their own subjective
experience. They are a spoilsport; no one can now experience the
conversation aesthetically, no matter what their orientation. At times,
Stroud does come close to the view I have laid out above. For example,
he writes: “the process of communication is the end of communicating –
individuals attentively responding to each other and the situation in such
a way as to truly instantiate a community of interacting being.”[45] Here
he sees interaction as central to a conversation marked by aesthetic
qualities. However, he does not give a fuller account of the qualities this
interaction has to possess for it to be called aesthetic. This is what I see
as fundamental for an explanation of the aesthetic character of
conversations. Orientation can provide a good basis for an aesthetic
interaction. However, in my view, its role is limited to this. Orientation
cannot even be a necessary condition, for a conversation can reach an
aesthetic level even without the type of conscious change in mindset
Stroud claims is necessary. For these reasons I believe Stroud’s account
of the aesthetics of communication built around the notion of orientation
is just half the story in discovering what makes a conversation an
aesthetic phenomenon.
One of the unfortunate consequences of my account is that it makes
aesthetic everyday conversations rarer phenomena than they would be
in Stroud’s model. Stroud believes that, just with proper orientation, even
a sales transaction at a supermarket checkout can have an aesthetic
quality to it.[46] I am much more skeptical about such a possibility. At
the checkout there is simply not enough time for the accumulation of the
situation I see as necessary for an aesthetic conversation to take place,
or at least it would necessitate much longer queues in stores. However,
there is a positive side to my account. Some have argued that one of the
features threatening the whole enterprise of everyday aesthetics is an
overly loose concept of the aesthetic. By making the aesthetic appear
almost everywhere, the whole notion is in danger of becoming
contentless and trivial, hence undermining the credibility of this new
field.[47] This pitfall arguably looms behind Stroud’s perspective on the
aesthetics of conversations. However, with its much more specific
conception of aesthetic experience, my position, drawing on the views of
Dewey and Davidson, is not guilty of looking at everyday phenomena
with a trivialized notion of aesthetic experience but may very well
contribute to a fuller understanding of the constituents of the aesthetics
of everyday life.
5. Conversations and the creation of communities
Now to the social import of the discussion promised at the beginning. My
account of conversations shows that language use is an inherently social
phenomenon; most artworks can be experienced alone but it takes at
least two to make a great conversation. Earlier I noted that such
conversations involve similar qualities to those at the heart of Arnold
Berleant’s “social aesthetics.” But the political implications of these views
significantly overlap as well. Berleant thinks his social aesthetics
promotes “reciprocity,” “collaboration,” “intimacy in personal relations,”
and other political ideals “at the heart of the democratic process.”[48] My
take on conversations continues Berleant’s attempt to bring aesthetics
more in line with social concerns and it also provides new perspectives
on the social character of language. For language is more than a social
phenomenon in the sense of conventionalist theories of meaning, going
beyond the fact that the coordination of our linguistic habits enables us to
understand our fellow language users. Ted Cohen’s analysis of
metaphors draws attention to these aspects of language use. He sees
the use of metaphors as a way of cultivating intimacy with other people.
Using a metaphorical expression implies the cooperation of the speaker
and the listener. Metaphor can, in other words, be seen as “a kind of
concealed invitation” to take part in an interpretive game as a result of
which those involved “are drawn closer to one another.”[49]
Even though metaphors are usually grasped quickly and without much
conscious effort, according to Cohen, complex mental activities
nevertheless function in the background. For a metaphor to work, the
speaker and the listener must have knowledge of one another’s “beliefs,
intentions, and attitudes.” This is Cohen’s example: calling your
departmental chair a Bolshevik. Especially now that communism is even
more of a minor force in the world than it was in the days of Cohen’s
article, the chairman will understand that you are not attempting to report
a fact. They know this because they know that you know they are not a
Bolshevik. Something like this reasoning enables them to realize that
what was said should not be taken literally, but figuratively. You also
know that they know that you know that they are not a Bolshevik. This
process gives you reassurance that they will interpret the expression in
the appropriate way, that is, not as a factual statement. This link
between the interlocutors makes the working of the metaphor possible.
Further deciphering the point of the metaphor will presuppose and reveal
even more detailed knowledge of the speaker’s mental life. This shows
how metaphor’s functioning is based on knowledge the speaker and
recipient share of one another. This is how metaphors can draw
language users closer together, promoting intimacy and a sense of
community between them. The size of the community a metaphor
creates varies. Potentially it consists of all those who share the required
information to appreciate the metaphor. But Cohen also notes that the
knowledge required in grasping a metaphor can be so intimate and
detailed that it will work only when spoken to a specific person.[50]
Cohen believes that this type of sharing and interplay characterizes
language use at large but has just become buried under the routine
character of everyday communicative activity. An examination of
metaphor illustrates how some uses of language can “initiate… the
cooperative act of comprehension which is, in any view, something more
than a routine act of understanding.”[51] Such an interaction is seen as
central to communication in the account Davidson lays out in his later
philosophy of language, and it shows that communication’s power to
cultivate intimacy is not limited to metaphors. Making an imaginative next
move in a conversation can require detailed knowledge of the
interlocutors’ mental lives, and of their linguistic capacities, in very much
the same way Cohen thinks is required in the case of metaphor. A
specific type of bond has to exist between the interlocutors if the kind of
conversation Davidson raises to the very heart of his later philosophy of
language is to succeed. I can make this linguistic maneuver, for I know
my listeners have sufficient knowledge and capacity to understand my
expression in the way I intend. It also seems that immediate
successfulness is an important factor of the sense of intimacy these sorts
of conversations create. Additional explanations of how utterances are to
be understood would weaken the intimate feel of the conversation.
Imaginative conversations of the kind Davidson thinks pose a problem
for conventionalist views of language can thereby give rise to the sense
of communality similar to that which Cohen thinks is created by the use
of metaphors. Again, Joyce can be taken as an extreme case of this
communality engendering interaction. Davidson writes: “[B]y
fragmentating familiar languages and recycling the raw material Joyce
provokes the reader into involuntary collaboration…. The center of
creative energy is thus moved from the artist to a point between the
writer and his audience.”[52] Goodman Ace’s linguistic virtuosity also
created interaction that involved an invitation for others to take part in
the linguistic play. The sense of togetherness initiated by his imaginative
use of language must be one important reason why people seem to talk
so warmly of him.
What makes these points interesting is that the sort of sense of
communality conversations are seen to be capable of engendering here
also have an important place in Dewey’s view of democracy.[53] In fact,
Dewey believes the health of this type of political system rests upon the
same kind of sensibility being held by its citizens, and he attributes to
communication and to how people, in general, interact with one another
a vital role in sustaining and in reinforcing the experience of communality
between them. Given that the conversations of the kind I have developed
above, based on Dewey’s aesthetics and Davidson’s later philosophy of
language, can bring about experiences of communality, they turn out to
be highly valuable from the perspective of Dewey’s democratic ideals,
perhaps even serving as a benchmark for all other types of
communication in society.[54]
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